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We estimate the impact of coups and top-secret coup authorizations on asset prices of partially nationalized
multinational companies that stood to benefit from US-backed coups. Stock returns of highly exposed
firms reacted to coup authorizations classified as top-secret. The average cumulative abnormal return
to a coup authorization was 9% over 4 days for a fully nationalized company, rising to more than 13%
over sixteen days. Pre-coup authorizations accounted for a larger share of stock price increases than
the actual coup events themselves.There is no effect in the case of the widely publicized, poorly executed
Cuban operations, consistent with abnormal returns to coup authorizations reflecting credible private
information. We also introduce two new intuitive and easy to implement nonparametric tests that do
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II n t r o d u c t i o n
Covert operations conducted by intelligence agencies were a key component of
superpower foreign policy during the Cold War. For the U.S., many of these
operations had the expressed goal of replacing “unfriendly” regimes - often ones
that had expropriated multinational corporate property - and were planned under
extreme secrecy. Since corporate property was always restored after a successful
regime change, these operations were potentially proﬁtable to nationalized companies.
If foreknowledge of these operations was truly secret, then pre-coup asset prices
should not reﬂect the expected future gains. However, this paper shows that not
only were U.S.-supported coups valuable to partially nationalized multinationals,
but in addition, asset traders arbitraged supposedly “top-secret” information concerning
plans to overthrow foreign governments.
Speciﬁcally, we estimate the eﬀect of secret United States, as well as allied,
government decisions to overthrow foreign governments on the stock prices of
companies that stood to beneﬁt from regime change. We consider companies
that had a large fraction of their assets expropriated by a government that was
subsequently a target of a U.S.-sponsored covert operation aimed at overthrowing
2the regime. Using timelines reconstructed from oﬃcial CIA documents, we ﬁnd
statistically and economically signiﬁcant eﬀects on stock prices both from the
regime change itself and from “top secret” authorizations. Total stock price gains
from coup authorizations were 3 times larger in magnitude than price changes
from the coups themselves. We thus show that there were substantial economic
incentives for ﬁrms to lobby for these operations. While we are unable to discern
precisely who was trading, or whether these economic incentives were decisive for
US policymakers (versus political ideology or geopolitics), we do show that regime
changes led to signiﬁcant economic gains for corporations that stood to beneﬁt
from U.S. interventions in developing countries.
Our ﬁndings complement other evidence in empirical political economy that
large, politically connected ﬁrms beneﬁt from favorable political regimes (Faccio
2006; Fisman 2001; Knight 2006; Snowberg et al. 2007). However, we show that
ﬁrms beneﬁt not only from publicly announced events but also from top-secret
events, suggesting information ﬂows from covert operations into markets. Our
results are consistent with recent papers that have used asset price data to show
that companies can proﬁtf r o mc o n ﬂict (DellaVigna and La Ferrara 2008; Guidolin
and La Ferrara 2007). We also provide evidence that private information generally
leaks into asset prices slowly over time. This is consistent with both private
information theories of asset price determination (Allen et al. 2006) and the
empirical literature on insider trading (Meulbroek 1992). We diﬀerentiate our
work from the prior work on insider trading in so far as the private information
b e i n gt r a d e do nc o n c e r n sg o v e r n m e n tp o l icy, and not company decisions or other
information generated within the company.
3The theoretical literature on coups in economics has emphasized the role of
domestic elites (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006). However, anti-democratic political
transitions have often been instigated, planned and even partially executed from
abroad, most notably by the U.S. and the former Soviet Union during the Cold
War. Operating under the threat of nuclear war, direct conﬂict between the two
superpowers was replaced by covert and proxy operations to install supporting
regimes (Chomsky 1986; Kinzer 2006). According to Easterly et al. (2010), 24
country leaders were installed by the CIA and 16 by the KGB since the end of the
Second World War.
Our paper also makes a methodological contribution to hypothesis testing in
event studies. The structure of our event study allows us to improve on existing
nonparametric tests. Nonparametric tests used in event studies do not use exact
small sample distributions but rather tests with faster asymptotic convergence to
a normal distribution (Campbell et al. 1997; Corrado and Zivney 1992). We
introduce two new small sample tests motivated by Fisher’s exact test that are
valid without asymptotic justiﬁcations.
Section 2 of this paper discusses the history of U.S. covert interventions, with
background on each of the coups in our sample. Section 3 describes the data and
our selection of companies and events. Section 4 outlines our estimation strategies
and Section 5 reports our main results along with a number of robustness checks
and small sample tests. Section 6 provides an interpretation of our main results;
we decompose coup gains to a multinational into public and private components.
We conclude in Section 7.
4II Background and History
The Central Intelligence Agency was created in 1947 under the National Security
Act of July 26. The act allowed for “functions and duties related to intelligence
aﬀecting the national security,” in addition to intelligence gathering (Weiner 2007).
Initially, the scope of the CIA was relegated to intelligence, though a substantial
and vocal group advocated for a more active role for the agency. This culminated
in National Security Council Directive No. 4, which ordered the CIA to undertake
covert actions against communism. In the United States, covert operations designed
to overthrow foreign governments were usually ﬁrst approved by the director of the
CIA and then subsequently by the President of the United States (Weiner 2007).
After Eisenhower’s election in 1952, Allen Dulles was appointed director of
the agency. Under Dulles, the CIA expanded its role to include planning and
executing overthrows of foreign governments using military force. All but eight
of the CIA operations listed in Table I, including four of the ﬁve studied in
this paper, began during Dulles’ reign as CIA director under the Eisenhower
administration. Allen Dulles was supported by his brother, John Foster Dulles,
who was the contemporaneous Secretary of State. The Dulles brothers together
wielded substantial inﬂuence over American foreign policy from 1952 to 1960.
In 1974, partly due to public outcry over the U.S. involvement in the military
coup in Chile, the Hughes-Ryan Act increased congressional oversight of CIA
covert operations. In 1975, the U.S. legislature formed subcommittees to investigate
American covert action. Afterwards, the intensity and scope of U.S. covert actions
fell substantially (Johnson 1989). The height of covert CIA activity lasted slightly
more than twenty years, encompassing the period between 1952 and 1974.
5Our sample of coups includes ﬁve such covert attempts. The ﬁrst one occurred
in Iran in August, 1953, when the CIA, joint with the UK’s MI6, engineered
a toppling of Prime Minister Mossadegh. Mossadegh had nationalized the oil
ﬁelds and reﬁnery at Abadan, which were the property of the Anglo-Iranian Oil
Company, itself a partially publicly owned company of the UK government. In
Guatemala, the CIA overthrow of Jacobo Arbenz Guzman in June, 1954 occurred
after the Arbenz government had nationalized most of United Fruit’s assets in
Guatemala. Next, in 1960 and 1961, both the United States and Belgium engaged
in independent operations to politically neutralize the government of Patrice Lumumba
in the Congo. Lumumba had refused to allow Katanga, a copper rich enclave
controlled by the Belgian multinational Union Mini` ere, to secede and avoid taxation
and potential nationalization. In Cuba, the Castro government nationalized all US
property in 1960, one year before the failed Bay of Pigs coup attempt in April,
1961. Finally, the Chilean nationalization of copper and other foreign owned assets
began under the Frei government but proposed compensation was substantially
lower and nationalizations more frequent after the Allende government came to
power in late 1970. Allende was in oﬃce less than 3 years before he was killed
during a coup on September 11, 1973. In Online Appendix A, we provide a more
detailed synopsis of each coup, focusing on the nature of the pre-coup regime, the
motivations behind the expropriations, the foreign responses, and the resolution
of the coup.
The qualitative evidence on links between business and coup planners is substantial.
First, much of the early CIA leadership was recruited from Wall Street. A 1945
report on the CIA’s precursor by Colonel Richard Park claimed that the “hiring
6and promotion of senior oﬃcers rested not on merit but on an old boy network from
Wall Street” (Weiner 2007, p. 7). Secondly, there was direct contact between the
companies that had been nationalized and the CIA. For example, at the time of the
coup planning against Arbenz, three high ranking members of the executive branch
of government had strong connections with the United Fruit Company. Alan
Dulles, a former member of the board of directors of the United Fruit Company,
was Director of the CIA. Thomas Dudley Cabot, held at diﬀerent times the
positions of Director of International Security Aﬀairs in the State Department and
CEO of the United Fruit Company. His younger brother, John Moore Cabot, was
secretary of Inter-American Aﬀairs during much of the coup planning in 1953 and
1954. Besides the fact that Anglo-Iranian was a majority state-owned company,
the company met with CIA agent (and later historian) Kermit Roosevelt, who
alleged in his 1954 history that the initial plan for the coup was proposed by the
Anglo Iranian Oil Company. In Belgium, the royal court and the powerful bank
Soci´ et´ eG ´ en´ erale tied together a social and ﬁnancial network of colonial oﬃcials
and businesses. De Witte writes that “the incontrovertible political conclusion is
that the political class, including the [Belgian] court, had a direct material interest
in the outcome of the Congo crisis” (De Witte 2001, p. 37). Most directly, the
minister of African Aﬀairs, a key instigator and planner of Operation Barracuda,
Harold d’Aspremont-Lyden was the nephew of Gobert d’Aspremont-Lyden who
was an administrator for Union Mini` ere. The Senate Church Committee reported
that the CIA held meetings with U.S. multinationals involved in Chile on a regular
basis, even to the point of ITT (whose board included John McCone, a former
director of the CIA) notoriously oﬀering the CIA $1 million to overthrow Allende’s
7government (Weiner 2007). In short, social links between the government oﬃcials
responsible for the coups and ﬁnancial interests are well-documented. Secret plans
for regime change could have easily made it into the ears of ﬁnancial actors who,
even if not directly connected to the aﬀected companies, could arbitrage this
information on the market.
Our results are consistent with the presence of both direct information leakage
between political decision makers and the companies that stood to beneﬁt, as
well as indirect information ﬂows to the market. We are unable to produce
deﬁnitive evidence on the identity of the traders, or pinpoint the exact source
of the information leakage.
III Data
We focused on the set of all CIA coups where a) the CIA attempted to eﬀect regime
change, b) the relevant planning documents have been declassiﬁed, and c) the
government had expropriated property from a publicly listed multinational. The
details of how we obtained a comprehensive list of coups, declassiﬁed documents,
and expropriations are described in Online Appendix B. We are left with 5 coups
where all three of our criteria are satisﬁed: Iran, Guatemala, Congo, Cuba, and
Chile. Online Appendix A provides detailed historical background for each of these
coups.
We ﬁrst extract all of the authorization events from the timelines. These are
restricted to events where either a coup was explicitly approved by the head of
a government or ministry (the President of the United States, Prime Minister of
the United Kingdom, or the Ministry for African Aﬀairs in Belgium), the head
8of an intelligence agency (the CIA or the MI6 ), or where US $1 million or more
was allocated to the overthrow of a foreign government. In the case of Congo, we
include the date of the assassination of Lumumba, which happened in secrecy and
was not known publicly for close to one month. Authorization events are coded
as “good”(+1) or “bad”(-1) depending on whether they increase or decrease the
likelihood of a coup. Our selection and coding of authorization events is presented
in Table II.
We also extract public events from the oﬃcial timelines for use as controls in
some speciﬁcations. Public events are restricted to dates where company assets are
nationalized or regime transitions and consolidations occur. The public events are
coded as “good”(+1) or “bad”(-1), where “good” events are those which are likely
to increase the stock price and ”bad” events are ones which are likely to cause a
decline in the stock price. The public events and their coding are listed in Online
Appendix Table AI. Table VII lists the dates of the regime changes themselves.
In addition to the data on the events, we also construct a dataset of daily stock
returns for publicly traded companies that were expropriated by the regimes that
were then overthrown by the CIA. Using a variety of sources, also documented in
Online Appendix A, we obtain the lists of companies expropriated in each country.
For each of these companies, we obtain the amounts expropriated from various
sources and daily stock market data, either from CRSP or from archival sources.
We deﬁne the exposure of a company to be the value of the assets expropriated
divided by the average market capitalization in the year prior to the nationalizing
regime coming into power. We also use market-level daily Fama-French four
factors: excess return of the NYSE, high minus low (book to price ratio), small
9minus big (market capitalization), and momentum. For years prior to 1962, we
obtained the daily HML and SMB factor data series from Oliver Boguth, and we
constructed the daily momentum factor ourselves. Post 1962 data on the factors
come from Ken French’s website. Additionally, we used a Perl script to generate a
daily count of the number of New York Times articles mentioning both the name of
the country and the country’s leader in the New York Times. Summary statistics
of the main variables are presented in Table III.
IV Methodology
Our main hypothesis is that authorization events result in an increase in the stock
price of the aﬀected company over the days following the event. We consider
cumulative abnormal returns after the authorization events. In contrast to public
events, we expect stock price reactions to top-secret events to potentially diﬀuse
slowly. Our benchmark speciﬁcation estimates a 4-day return starting at the event
date, though we consider alternative speciﬁcations ranging from 1 to 21 days.
We employ two diﬀerent estimation strategies: a regression using the augmented
Fama-French four factor model, and a new set of distribution-free small sample
tests.
A Regression Method
For the regression method, we regress a company’s stock price return on an
indicator for authorization events interacted with the company’s exposure. We
also control for four Fama-French factors (excess return of the NYSE, SMB,
HML, and momentum):
10(1)  = Xβ + ()+
where  is the one day raw stock return for ﬁrm  between the closing price
at date  − 1 and the closing price at date  and X is the vector of factors.
() is a variable which takes on the value of a company’s exposure for a  day
period beginning with an authorization day, and zero otherwise. The average daily
abnormal return over the  day period is . The cumulative abnormal return is

1. We consider values of  ranging from 1 to 21. In our multiple country




sample is the time period starting exactly one year before the nationalizing regime
comes to power until the day before the beginning of the coup. The standard
error for the cumulative abnormal return is given by the maximum of robust
standard errors, standard errors clusteredo nd a t e ,a n ds t a n d a r de r r o r sc l u s t e r e d
on company.
B Small Sample Tests
One problem with the regression method as well as traditional event studies is
that the distribution of abnormal returns is often non-normal, and the number of
events is often small. As a result, use of conventional standard errors may produce
an incorrect test size. We provide two non-parametric small sample tests based on
the sign and rank tests used in the literature. Unlike the conventional rank and
sign tests, however, we use “exact” distributions that do not rely on asymptotic
1Note that this is a standard approximation to (1 + )
 − 1
11justiﬁcations.
The standard rank and sign tests are motivated by the observation that these
test statistics converge much faster to a normal distribution than the mean. Others
have noted that the sign test has an analogue to Fisher’s exact test, which uses the
binomial distribution to calculate a distribution-free test for signiﬁcance, which we
also implement. We extend this idea to the rank test, noting that the rank has a
uniform distribution, and thus also permits a distribution-free test for the average
rank.
We begin by estimating a market model with the four factors in an “estimation
window” that is prior to any coup-related events. Our estimation window is two
calendar years in length and begins three years before the nationalizing regime
comes to power. We estimate ﬁrm-speciﬁc cumulative abnormal returns for 4−day
windows starting with authorization dates. We weight these CARs by company
exposure and form country-portfolio speciﬁcC A R s . T h eo v e r a l lC A Rt a k e sa
simple average of returns over country-portfolios.
We ﬁrst generalize the sign test by considering the number of events that have
a  day  greater than a given percentile ,w h e r e is computed using 
day s in the estimation sample from country  When cumulative abnormal
returns are independently distributed across countries and events, the one-sided








 (1 − )
−
where  is the total number of events. This is the p-value of the one-sided
Binomial sign test. Since the  percentile return is estimated based on a ﬁnite
12estimation sample, and multiple events within the same country use the same
estimated  percentile cutoﬀ, this may induce a cross-event correlation in the
measured percentiles within countries. Therefore, besides calculating the -value
analytically using equation (2), we also follow the literature on randomization
inference (Andrews 2003; Conley and Taber [forthcoming]) and simulate our test
statistic. First we draw  percentiles from a uniform distribution, where  is
the size of country ’s estimation window. We then draw  additional returns,
where  is the number of events, from a uniform distribution.2 We then estimate
the  percentile return from the  d r a w s . N e x t ,w ec o u n tt h en u m b e ro f
draws above the  percentile of the  draws. We do this for all ﬁve countries
and then compute the average number of event returns above the  percentile,
and repeat this procedure 10,000 times to estimate the simulated counterpart to
equation (2).
Finally, parallel to the Binomial test developed above, we construct an analogue
of the rank test (Corrado 1989; Campbell et al. 1997) exploiting the independence
of events in our country portfolio sample to obtain exact inference. We rank each
of our events relative to the distribution of abnormal returns in the estimation
window. We then convert the rank into a percentile. Noting that, for i.i.d.
variables, percentile is uniformly distributed, we compute the CDF for the sum
of the percentiles of  independently and uniformly distributed random variables
over the interval [01].3 Without loss of generality, we assume that the mean
percentile  ≥ 05. Given the symmetry of the cumulative distribution function,
2Both the Binomial and the Uniform tests can be shown to be independent of the
distribution of the return draws for all distributions. A proof of this is available from the
authors upon request.
3This test was suggested, but not pursued, by Corrado (1989).
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We derive test statistics using the analytical equation from equation (3). However,
similar to the Binomial test, we also simulate the distribution of average ranks.
We report the modiﬁed sign and rank test results by country as well for the
successful coups and the full sample. Finally, for the purpose of comparison, we
also report asymptotic standard errors using the standard deviations of returns in
the estimation window (Campbell et al. 1997).
VR e s u l t s
A Baseline Results
In Table IV, we report the cumulative abnormal returns for authorization events
interacted with exposure over periods ranging from 1 to 16 days in length. We
use (0−1) to denote the -day period beginning with the day of the event. We
ﬁnd clear evidence that stock prices react positively to authorization events. Row
1 of Table IV shows that, in the pooled sample of all companies, the average 4
day stock price return for an authorization event is 9.4% with a standard error of
2.7%. This implies that a hypothetical company that had all its assets expropriated
could be expected, on average, to experience roughly a 9.4% increase in its stock
price within the four days following the secret authorization of a CIA coup. The
cumulative abnormal returns are generally signiﬁcant at the 1% level for the all
14country sample from 4 through 13 days after the event. The abnormal returns
continue to increase between days 4 and 16 after the event, consistent with the
hypothesis that private information is incorporated into asset prices with a delay.
In Row 2, we restrict attention to the set of 4 successful coups (i.e., excluding
Cuba), and the corresponding estimates are consistently larger by around 25%-30%.
The sample size drops substantially due to the large number of expropriated ﬁrms
in Cuba. In Row 3, we restrict attention to the events that were authorizations
(and deauthorizations) of coups that were later cancelled. The mean eﬀect increases
somewhat in magnitude (13.4% after 4 days), reaching a maximum of 19.7% at
10% signiﬁcance after 16 days. We interpret the results on the cancelled coups
to provide additional evidence that the stock price reactions reﬂected changes in
beliefs due to the authorizations themselves, and not the expected coup or trends
leading up to the coup4.
Rows 4-9 show the results for separately for each country. For Chile, the
eﬀect is positive by the fourth day after the authorization event, but small and
insigniﬁcant. It also stays small through the longer horizons considered. In
Row 5, we consider Congo, which exhibits a large 16.7% eﬀect on the day of
an authorization event. The cumulative abnormal return increases to 22.7% after
4 days and then stabilize, becoming statistically insigniﬁcant after 10 days. In
Row 6, we restrict attention to the events in the Congo sample that were decisions
made by Belgian oﬃcials, as the aﬀected company was Belgian and the operation
was independent of the United States. Eﬀects in this sample are even larger, with
4Although not reported in the table, if we further restrict attention to the
deauthorization events themselves, the stock price of a fully-exposed company fell by
11.7% within four days of a deauthorization, which further conﬁrms this interpretation.
15an immediate 27.3% eﬀect after the event, rising to a 5% signiﬁcant 46.2% after
16 days.
Row 7 shows the results for Cuba. There are two operations and thus two sets of
events in Cuba. The ﬁrst is the failed Bay of Pigs invasion. The second is Operation
Mongoose which was started after the Bay of Pigs but was ultimately cancelled.
More details about the Cuban operations are available in Online Appendix A.
There is virtually no eﬀect in the Cuba subsample even after 16 days and, though
not reported in the tables, for both operations considered individually. The
qualitative evidence suggests two possible reasons for the absence of an eﬀect
in Cuba: (1.) Due to the high degree of public aggression from the United
States towards Cuba, including numerous bombing missions, the coup was already
commonly believed to be in planning and thus information about top-secret authorizations
were not considered “news” by ﬁnancial market actors.5 (2.) Traders were pessimistic
about success, partially owing to a combination of incompetence and lack of
political commitment towards the coup by the Kennedy Administration. Though
we are not able to convincingly reject either explanation, we do provide additional
evidence later in the paper that some traders did believe in the possibility of a
successful Bay of Pigs operation.
Rows 8 and 9 show the results for Guatemala and Iran, respectively. Guatemala
s h o w sa ni m m e d i a t ea n ds i g n i ﬁcant 4.9% increase, which continues to grow to
16.5% after 4 days and 20.5% after 7 days, also signiﬁcant at 5% conﬁdence. After
this, the coeﬃcient in the Guatemala subsample is not statistically signiﬁcant,
although the point estimate generally remains large. In the Iran subsample, we do
5“When Kennedy reads the [NYT] story he exclaims that Castro doesn’t need spies in
the United States; all he has to do is read the newspaper”.(Wyden 1979)
16not see an immediate reaction to the event, but we do see a signiﬁcant 7.4% eﬀect
after 4 days, increasing to 10.3% after 7 days and continuing to increase to 20.2%
at 16 days, all signiﬁcant at the 1% or 5% level. Overall, our country results shows
that in the three out of the ﬁve countries with statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects, the
results were visible and clear within 4 days. However, in all these cases, the eﬀects
tended to grow over the following days, consistent with slow diﬀusion of private
information into asset prices.
The eﬀects reported in Table IV are for a hypothetical company that was
fully nationalized. To obtain the average eﬀect for the sample of companies in a
given country, we would need to multiply the coeﬃcient by the mean exposure
for companies in that country. The average exposure in the sample was 17.9%, so
Column 2 of Table IV implies that the cumulative return in the sample companies
was 1.6% after four days. As a speciﬁc example, Union Mini` ere had 33.8% of its
overall assets exposed, which implies that the cumulative abnormal return in the
Congo subsample was 7.6% after 4 days. Similarly, United Fruit had 14.8% of its
assets exposed, which implies a 2.4% return over 4 days. Finally, Anglo-Iranian
had 31.0% of its assets nationalized in Iran, and so the implied cumulative 4 day
increase following an authorization event for that company was 2.3%.
Figure I provides graphical evidence, parallel with Table IV, on abnormal
returns around an authorization event, with 95% conﬁdence intervals shown. We
compute cumulative abnormal returns () using the regression method aggregated
across events for each of the 20 days prior to as well as following an event. For
the 20 days prior to the event, we aggregate backwards starting at the event date
(date 0), so (−) is the cumulative abnormal return between dates − and
170. For returns starting prior to date 0, we also include as a control an indicator
for a 10-day period after an authorization date, in the case when the events are
suﬃciently close together that cumulative returns prior to one authorization event
includes returns that follow another authorization event. The only country where
the windows overlap is Iran, and none of the other ﬁgures look diﬀerent if we do not
account for the overlap in ()a n d(−) windows when cumulating over
days prior to the event. For our full sample, cumulative abnormal returns become
signiﬁcant at a 5% level on the day of an event and remain signiﬁcant. The rise
over this period is generally monotonic until day 16, and seems to be permanent.
Considering returns prior to the event date, however, the (−)’s show no
trends and are never signiﬁcant. We conclude that there was no pre-existing trend
in the stock price prior to an event, suggesting that the CIA did not authorize coups
in response to drops in the value of connected companies or pre-existing political
trends that would also be priced into the stock return. Figure II shows the 
graphs separately by country. As expected, individual country time paths are more
imprecise due to sample size limitations, with consistently signiﬁcant results only
in Congo, Guatemala and Iran. There is no evidence of a persistent and signiﬁcant
pre-trend in any of the individual countries. Overall, the evidence on timing shows
that authorization events led to positive asset price movements - usually with some
lag.
B Robustness
Our benchmark speciﬁcation (Column 2 of Table IV) shows that abnormal returns
were positive and signiﬁcant in the four days following an authorization event.
18However, this could be due to downturns in the broad market, contemporaneous
information about public events, or positive industry-speciﬁcs h o c k s . T os h o w
that the positive abnormal returns reﬂect changes in company-speciﬁc returns,
we consider a number of robustness checks in Table V. All are estimated for the
pooled sample, the set of successful coups, and separately by country. We compute
cumulative abnormal returns over a 4 day period following an authorization event.
Except for columns 1 and 5, all speciﬁcations include the four Fama-French factors
interacted with a company dummy (or country-speciﬁc company dummies for
multi-country regressions) as controls. As in Table IV, we report the coeﬃcient on
the authorization dummy interacted with the company’s exposure, multiplied by
the number of days in the window (4 in this case); multicountry estimates average
the coeﬃcients across the countries.
First, we regress raw returns, unadjusted by any of the market factors, on our
authorization events. We conﬁrm that the cumulative abnormal return eﬀects were
due to increases in the aﬀected company’s stock prices, and not due to changes in
market-level movements. Column 1 of Table V shows a 4-day cumulative abnormal
return of 9.5%, virtually identical to our benchmark speciﬁcation.
Top-secret decisions to overthrow foreign governments may have coincided with
public events in the targeted countries. This could bias our estimates, reﬂecting the
eﬀect of public news rather than private information. In Column 2 we control for
the number of articles in the New York Times mentioning both the country and the
country leader by name, as well as other public events; these are nationalizations
of foreign owned property as well as electoral transitions and consolidations which
are also mentioned in the timelines, all listed in Online Appendix Table AI. We
19multiply these measures with company exposure and the country dummies, and
include them as controls in our main speciﬁcation. The coeﬃcient in the pooled
sample is only slightly smaller than the one in the main speciﬁcation, and still
shows a 7.2% 4-day return which is signiﬁcant at the 1% level. In Column 3 we
drop all dates where the New York Times had at least one article mentioning
both the country and the leader by name (Meulbroek 1992). Since most days
have at least one political article about the coup countries, we lose over 2/3 of
our sample in this speciﬁcation, making this a strong test. However, our eﬀect
actually becomes stronger despite the country with the largest baseline eﬀect,
Congo, dropping out of the sample. The mean eﬀect in the pooled country sample
is 12.5% return over four days and still signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Congo is very
prominently covered in the news, and hence does not have any events that are not
contemporaneous with some New York Times coverage. While all the countries
lose observations from the sample restrictions, the estimates for Chile and Iran are
actually larger than in the baseline speciﬁcation, and the coeﬃcients for Guatemala
a n dI r a na r es t i l ls i g n i ﬁcant at least the 5% conﬁdence level. Cuba only has one
authorization date that has no contemporaneous New York Times articles about
Cuba and Castro, reﬂecting the extensive leakage of the Bay of Pigs operation as
well as general news interest in Cuba over the sample period. The scaling back of
the second operation, Mongoose, on February 2, 1962, does indeed fall on a news
free day. While not signiﬁcant, the positive and relatively larger coeﬃcient on this
subsample is consistent with our interpretation that secret (de)authorizations do
cause decreases in stock prices when they actually constitute “news.”
One potential explanation for our ﬁndings is price momentum around the
20authorization dates. This may either reﬂect pre-existing information ﬂows or
trading activities unrelated to coup planning. We include a control that interacts
the exposure measure with a dummy that is equal to 1 in a 20 day window around
each authorization event. This speciﬁcation tests whether the abnormal returns
are higher in the 4 days right after an authorization than in the average of the 20
day period surrounding each authorization event. Column 4 of Table V shows that
the four-day abnormal return is 9.9%, actually slightly higher than our benchmark,
and statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Pre-existing price trends do not explain
our results.
We also consider two placebos. In Column 5 of Table V we regress NYSE index
returns on our private information variable, omitting the other three factors. Our
pooled estimate is equal to 0.02% and is insigniﬁcant. None of the country speciﬁc
regressions are signiﬁcant at the 10% either. In column 6 of Table V, we use
daily stock returns from a matched company, where the match is constructed by
taking the company closest in the Mahalanobis metric (constructed from market
capitalization and market beta) within each 3-digit industry code, subject to
having data available for all of the authorization dates. The matched companies
are listed in Online Appendix Table AII. This placebo is also insigniﬁcant in the
pooled sample as well as all the subsamples, suggesting that our eﬀects are not
driven by industry speciﬁcs h o c k s .
Finally, we consider the eﬀect of authorizations on the log of trading volumes
for the set of countries for which data is available. In both the pooled samples
as well as the individual country regressions, our event variable is positive and
signiﬁcant. This is true even in Chile and Cuba, where the eﬀect on returns was
21insigniﬁcant. The ﬁnding of increased trading in the four days including and just
after authorization days is consistent with theoretical predictions of heterogeneous
belief models (Wang, 1994) of stock trading as well as prior empirical work on the
volume impacts of insider trading (Cornell and Sirri 1992).
C Time-Shifted Placebos
As additional evidence that our eﬀects are not an artifact of the data, we re-estimate
our main speciﬁcation on a set of placebo dates. We take our 4 day cumulative
abnormal returns and shift our authorization events forwards as well as backwards
by 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, and 40 days. For an  day shift, we estimate:
(4)  = Xβ + +(4) + 




|| . We exclude all days with other authorizations, public events,
or that occur during the coup itself. We graph our estimates against the number
of days shifted in ﬁgure III.
Out of the 19 time-shifted regressions,  is only signiﬁcant for  =0  our
benchmark speciﬁcation with cumulative abnormal return of approximately 9.38%
for a fully exposed company, which is signiﬁcant at the 1% level. None of the 18
other dates have a magnitude above 4% and none of them are signiﬁcant at even
the 10% level. The placebo estimates reinforce that our baseline estimates are
not due to local serial correlation in returns. The pattern of no abnormal returns
before a decision, sizeable abnormal returns just after a decision, and smaller
possible abnormal returns in the medium run after a decision is consistent with
22our hypothesis of secret authorization events causing an increase in the stock price.
D Small Sample Tests
In Table VI, we present the results from our small sample tests. First, we present
the four day s of country portfolios, based on out-of-sample estimates. The
s here represent the actual (exposure weighted) change in stock prices for
aﬀected companies in a given sample, while the regression coeﬃcients represent
the eﬀects for a hypothetical company that was fully exposed. For comparability,
the regression coeﬃcients would need to be multiplied by mean exposure levels,
although the comparability is inexact due to how exposures are treated in the two
cases. The results are listed in Row 1 of Table VI. For the full sample, the average
four day weighted  was 2.6%. The estimate is statistically signiﬁcant at the
1% level using asymptotic standard errors.
Turning to our small sample tests, we ﬁnd that 18 out of the 22 events
in the full country sample have returns greater than the median return in the
“estimation window” (i.e., the year prior to any nationalization event), producing
a one-sided probability value under the null hypothesis of 0.35%.6 13 of those
events have returns above the 80 percentile, which would occur by chance alone
with probability less than 0.02%. Eight of the events have returns greater than
the 90 percentile, which have an associated probability value of 0.11% under the
null. Finally, the average rank of all 22 events is 0.74, which would be obtained
by chance with a probability less than 0.06%. When we consider the set of four
successful coups, the conclusion is strengthened. The probability values associated
6In the text, we report the higher of the analytical and simulated probability values.
Both are reported in the table. All reported probability values are one-sided.
23with the Uniform rank test, as well as the Binomial sign tests (for 50,8 0  and
90 percentiles) are all under 0.1%.
Due to small sample size, the individual country tests have low power and thus
p-values are larger. Congo and Guatemala consistently produce probability values
under 10% for all the tests, and smaller for most. Iran produces probability values
ranging between 3% and 14% except for the 90 percentile, while Chile ranges
from 5% and 33%. Finally, consistent with our results above, Cuba shows no
systematic increase in returns following authorization events. For example, only
three out of the six events show positive returns, while the rest are negative.
Our results also show heterogeneity across events. While there does not seem
to be a substantial reaction to a few events, most show positive reactions. And
many show reactions that were very strong, as exempliﬁe db yt h ef a c tt h a t8o u t
of 22 events are above the 90percentile in returns.
Overall, our modiﬁed sign and rank tests provide strong evidence that the 4-day
returns after authorization events are, on average, highly statistically signiﬁcant,
and our conclusions are not driven by the size of our sample and non-normal
distribution of returns. Also, they show us that there are reactions to some events
and not to others. However, when there is a reaction, the eﬀect is strong and
unmistakable.
VI Assessing the Gains from Coups
We also estimate abnormal returns for the coup attempts themselves using our
main speciﬁcation. We do this for two reasons. First, we want to test if these
companies were aﬀected by the actual coup attempts, conﬁrming that companies
24were beneﬁtting from the anticipated regime change. Second, we want to compare
the direct eﬀect of the coup itself to the total net rise due to pre-coup authorizations.
We look at two estimates of the eﬀect of the coup: abnormal returns during
the coup window and abnormal returns on the ﬁrst day of the new regime. We
deﬁne the coup window as the period from and including the ﬁr s td a yo ft h ec o u p
to and including the ﬁrst day of the new regime (the last day of the coup attempt
in the case of Cuba). These dates are listed in Table VII.
Over the duration of the coup, the average cumulative return across countries
was 12.1%. The result is slightly higher at 13.4% when we restrict attention to the
successful coups. The ﬁrst day of the new government measure is slightly lower for
both the full as well as successful coups samples at 10.0% and 11.8% respectively.
The individual country estimates are also relatively similar across the two
measures for most of our sample. Chile and Congo’s coups are both one day events,
and so the eﬀect is identical across measures: 6.1% and signiﬁcant at the 5% level
for Chile and 8.7% and insigniﬁcant at conventional levels for Congo. The eﬀects
f o rC u b aa r en e a r- 5 %f o rb o t hm e a s u r e s . T h eﬁrst day of the new government
eﬀect is signiﬁcant at the 1% level, reinforcing that there is belief in the possibility
of a successful coup in Cuba7. The coup window eﬀect is larger for Iran than the
ﬁrst day of the new government. The coup window eﬀect, 18.8%, is signiﬁcant at
the 10% level; the ﬁrst day of the new government eﬀect is substantially smaller
at 7.0%. For Guatemala, the sign actually ﬂips. The coup window eﬀect for
Guatemala is actually negative and somewhat sizeable. The ﬁrst day of the new
7In a prior version of the paper, we also included an estimate of the return on the ﬁrst
day of the coup. For Cuba, the estimate was positive and signiﬁcant, reinforcing the view
that some traders thought that a successful coup was possible.
25government eﬀect, however, is quite a bit larger and positive in sign. The two
numbers are -10.3% and 22.7%, the latter number being statistically signiﬁcant at
the 1% level. We attribute the stock price fall over the coup window to the fact
that the junta which initially took power when Arbenz resigned did not support
the return of assets to United Fruit. Further exacerbating the uncertainty around
United Fruit assets, the eleven days following Arbenz’s resignation saw four interim
governments come to power. Finally, the candidate backed by the CIA, Castillo
Armas, took power (Gleijeses 1991). Despite the uncertainty, Armas eventually
returned United Fruit assets.
We now compare the magnitudes of the net authorization events to the coup
event eﬀects. We use the country-speciﬁc1 3d a ys in order to compute the
value per authorization for each country. The longer horizon return is used in
order to capture the full asset price change due to a leaked authorization. The
total rise in the stock price due to authorizations is then just one plus the return to
an authorization raised to the power of the net number of events8 plus the return
over the coup window:
(5) (1 + )
 (1 + )
where  is the thirteen day cumulative abnormal return in country  
is the net number of authorization events, and  is the cumulative abnormal
8In the case of Guatemala, the number of net events is two out of total four events
since one event was an aborted coup and thus counted as negative; in the case of Congo,
the number of net events is one, because out of ﬁve events, two are negative; in the case
of Cuba, the net events is two because two of the six events are negative. For the pooled
country samples, we use the mean number of events across countries as the net events.
Thus gives us 2.6 for the full country sample and 2.4 for the successful coups sample.
26return in country  on the ﬁrst day of the new regime. We use the return on
the ﬁrst day of the new government because, due to the length of the coup in
Guatemala and the ensuing political instability after the end of the Arbenz regime,
there is a net negative change in the stock price over the exact coup window.
The results are listed in Table VII. While we can combine the eﬀects of the
authorization events and the coup itself in most of the countries, the failure of
the operation in Cuba makes interpretation of the resulting comparison diﬃcult.
Thus we interpret the Cuba numbers as the relative magnitude of stock price
movements from the coup event and the authorization events. The inclusion of
Cuba in our cross-country sample also makes the full sample decomposition diﬃcult
to interpret. Although we report both the Cuba decomposition and full sample
decomposition, we focus on the successful coup sample and the other 4 countries.
If we assume the only source of coup-related asset price movements are our
events, together with the coup itself, we can estimate the total gains from the
coup. The average gain per authorization in the all country sample is 12.0%, and
the mean return on the ﬁrst day of the post-coup regime is 10.0%. For the set of
successful coups, the gains from authorization events were roughly three times that
from the coup events; 75.5% of the relative gains come from authorization events.
By country, the total gains from the coup ranged greatly. For a fully exposed
company, the returns range from 14.1% in Chile to 77.1% in Guatemala. We also
compute that the relative percentage beneﬁt of the coup attributable to ex-ante
authorization events, which amounted to 55.0% in Chile, 66.1% in Guatemala,
72.4% in Congo, and 86.9% in Iran. Overall, much of the gains from the coup
occurred before the coup itself due to speculation from top-secret information. This
27suggests that estimates of the value of the coup to a company that only considered
the stock price reaction to the coup itself would be dramatically understated.
VII Conclusion
Covert operations organized and abetted by foreign governments have played a
substantial role in the political and economic development of poorer countries
around the world. We look at CIA-backed coups against governments which had
nationalized a considerable amount of foreign investment. Using an event-study
methodology, we ﬁnd that private information regarding coup authorizations and
planning increased the stock prices of expropriated multinationals that stood to
beneﬁt from the regime change. The presence of these abnormal returns suggests
that there were leaks of classiﬁed information to asset traders. Consistent with
theories of asset price determination under private information, this information
often took some time to be fully reﬂected in the stock price.
We ﬁnd that coup authorizations, on net, contributed substantially more to
stock price rises of highly exposed companies than the coup events themselves.
This suggests that most of the value of the coup to the aﬀected companies had
already been anticipated and incorporated into the asset price before the operation
was undertaken.
Our results are robust to a variety of controls for alternate sources of information,
including public events and newspaper articles. They are also robust across countries
with the exception of Cuba. The anomalous results for Cuba are potentially due
to public information leaks and inadequate organization that surrounded that
particular coup attempt. Our results are consistent with evidence in political
28science that business interests exert disproportionate inﬂuence on foreign policy
(Jacobs and Page 2005), as well as historical accounts which suggest that protecting
foreign investments was a motivation for undertaking regime change (Kinzer 2006).
However, further empirical research is needed to uncover whether or not economic
factors were decisive determinants of U.S. government decisions to covertly overthrow
foreign governments.
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32Project Country Year Description Coup Exprop.
Ajax Iran 1953 Yes Coup against Mossadeq Yes Yes
FU/Belt Chile 1970-73 Yes Coup against Allende Yes Yes
Bloodstone Germany 1946 No Recruitment of Nazis No No
Brushfire US 1955 Yes Propaganda at Universities No No
Camelot Chile 1960s No Funded Anthro. Research No NA
ST/Circus Tibet 1955 No Trained Tibetan Rebels Yes No
Democracy Nicaragua 1985 No Anti-Sandinista Operations No Yes
IA/Feature Angola 1975 No Supported Savimbi No Yes
Fiend Albania 1949 No Insurgency Yes No
Fortune/PB/Success Guatemala 1952-54 Yes Coup Against Arbenz Yes Yes
PM/Forget All over 1950s No Pro-U.S. Media Distortion No NA
Haik Indonesia 1956/57 No Military Support for Rebels Yes Yes
HardNose Vietnam 1965 No Disrupt Viet Cong Supplies No No
Momentum Laos 1959 No Trained Hmong in Laos No No
Mongoose Cuba 1961 Yes Post-Bay of Pigs Operations No Yes
Opera France 1951 No Electoral Manipulations No No
Paper China 1951 No Invasion from Burma No No
Stole N. Korea 1950/51 No Sabotage No No
Tiger Syria 1956 Yes Assassination Attempts No No
Washtub Guatemala 1954 Yes Anti-Arbenz Propaganda No Yes
Wizard Congo 1960 Yes Lumumba Assassination Yes Yes
Zapata Cuba 1960-61 Yes Bay of Pigs Yes Yes
Planning Docs 
Declassified
Notes: (1.) Project is the name of the operation, (2.) Country is the target country of the operation, (3.) Year is the year when the operation was carried 
out, (4.) Planning documents records yes if the planning documents are publicly available, (5.) Description is a description of the operation, (6.) Coup 
is recorded as yes if a coup was planned as part of the operation and no otherwise, and (7.) Exprop. refers to whether or not the regime nationalized 
(or expropriated) property from multinational firms operating within the country.
Coup Selection
Table I Date Country Description Good Cancelled
September 15, 1970 Chile Nixon Authorizes Anti-Allende Plan (Incl. Poss. Coup) Y N
January 28, 1971 Chile 40 Committee Appropriates $1.2 Million Y N
October 26, 1972 Chile 40 Committee Appropriates $1.4 Million Y N
August 20, 1973 Chile 40 Committee Appropriates $1 Million Y N
August 18, 1960 Congo Eisenhower Endorses Lumumba's Elimination Y Y
September 12, 1960 Congo Belgian Operation Barracuda Begins Y Y
October 11, 1960 Congo Operation Barracuda Cancelled N Y
December 5, 1960 Congo CIA Stops Operation N Y
January 18, 1961 Congo Lumumba  Secretly Killed Y N
March 17, 1960 Cuba Eisenhower Approves Plan to Overthrow Castro Y N
August 18, 1960 Cuba Eisenhower Approves $13 Million to Overthrow Castro Y N
January 30, 1961 Cuba Kennedy Authorizes Continuing Bay of Pigs Op Y N
November 4, 1961 Cuba Operation Mongoose Planning Authorized Y Y
February 26, 1962 Cuba Operation Mongoose Scaled Back N Y
October 30, 1962 Cuba Operation Mongoose Cancelled N Y
August 18, 1952 Guatemala DCIA Approves PBFortune (Coup to Overthrow Arbenz) Y Y
October 8, 1952 Guatemala PBFortune Halted N Y
December 9, 1953 Guatemala DCIA Approves PBSuccess (Coup to Overthrow Arbenz) Y N
April 19, 1954 Guatemala Full Approval Given to PBSuccess Y N
June 19, 1953 Iran CIA/MI6 Both Approve Coup Y N
July 1, 1953 Iran Churchill Approves Coup  Y N
July 11, 1953 Iran Eisenhower Appoves Coup Y N
Table II
Authorization Event Selection
Notes: (1.) Date is the date of the event, (2.) Country is the target country of the coup attempt, (3.) Description gives a brief description of the event, (4.) 
Good is coded as Y if the event should raise the share value of the company and N if the event should lower the share value of the company, (5.) 
Cancelled is coded as Y if the operation was cancelled and N if it was executed, (6.) The 40 Committee was the subgroup of the executive branch 
National Security Council responsible for authorizing covert actions after 1964.Company Country N Market Cap Exposure Volume
Anaconda Co Chile 2224 3333 4.80E+08 3.20E+08 0.6666 0.0000 0.0234 24298.61 0.5494
Bethlehem Steel Corp Chile 2225 3312 9.79E+08 2.50E+07 0.0255 0.0002 0.0177 36475.6 0.5494
Cerro Corp Chile 2224 1031 1.53E+08 1.41E+07 0.0923 -0.0001 0.0231 11858.5 0.5494
General Tire & Rubr Co Chile 2225 3011 3.29E+08 1.20E+07 0.0365 -0.0002 0.0188 14514.7 0.5494
International Tel & Teleg Corp Chile 2223 3662 2.57E+09 1.07E+08 0.0417 0.0000 0.0183 61939.7 0.5501
Kennecott Copper Corp Chile 2225 3331 1.33E+09 2.17E+08 0.1633 0.0002 0.0194 31554.1 0.5494
Union Miniere Congo 1124 1021 1.85E+11 6.25E+10 0.3379 -0.0009 0.0268 0.8823
American Sugar Refng Co Cuba 2085 2061 5.84E+07 5.52E+07 0.9452 0.0007 0.0167 709.2 2.6749
Canada Dry Corp Cuba 2088 2090 4.90E+07 1.11E+06 0.0227 0.0003 0.0127 1949.1 2.6733
Coca Cola Co Cuba 2087 2090 6.05E+08 1.87E+07 0.0310 0.0005 0.0115 2301.3 2.6592
Colgate Palmolive Co Cuba 2087 2841 2.79E+08 9.88E+06 0.0354 0.0006 0.0167 3880.8 2.6740
Continental Can Inc Cuba 2089 3411 5.55E+08 6.07E+06 0.0109 -0.0001 0.0165 4590.7 2.6696
Freeport Sulphur Co Cuba 2089 1477 2.26E+08 6.02E+07 0.2658 0.0002 0.0171 2730.5 2.6725
International Tel & Teleg Corp Cuba 2087 3662 5.40E+08 8.90E+07 0.1649 0.0005 0.0206 11711.5 2.6714
Lone Star Cement Corp Cuba 2087 3272 2.52E+08 1.69E+07 0.0672 0.0001 0.0163 3543.9 2.6716
Swift & Co Cuba 2088 2011 2.44E+08 4.05E+06 0.0166 0.0000 0.0127 2607.2 2.6738
United Fruit Co Cuba 2088 2062 3.03E+08 5.88E+07 0.1941 -0.0002 0.0165 7255.9 2.6733
Woolworth F W Co Cuba 2088 5331 5.58E+08 6.26E+06 0.0112 0.0002 0.0106 3537.8 2.6655
United Fruit Co  Guatemala 3469 120 5.31E+08 7.83E+07 0.1475 0.0001 0.0116 3412.3 0.2170
Anglo-Iranian   Iran 2391 2910 7.46E+09 2.31E+09 0.3103 0.0006 0.0204 0.7525
 Table III
Summary Statistics
Notes: (1.) Summary statistics by country and company are shown over the event window, (2.) N gives the number of observations for the majority of 
listed variables for a given company in a given country; in some cases, particular variables are missing for a few days for a given company/country, (3.) 
Market Cap is the average price times the outstanding shares starting two years before the nationalizing regime comes to power and ending one year 
before the nationalizing regime comes to power, (4.) Expropriated Value is the dollar amount of the assets that were expropriated from the company by 
the coup country government, (5.) Exposure is the ratio of nationalized to total assets for the company/country, (6.) Raw returns and volume are at the 














Variable(0,0) (0,3) (0,6) (0,9) (0,12) (0,15)
All Coups 0.0435 0.0938 0.0990 0.1055 0.1204 0.1342
(0.0162)*** (0.0270)*** (0.0345)*** (0.0390)*** (0.0424)*** (0.0522)**
22157 22157 22157 22157 22157 22157
Successful Coups 0.0551 0.1208 0.1274 0.1309 0.1459 0.1640
(0.0201)*** (0.0336)*** (0.0425)*** (0.0481)*** (0.0523)*** (0.0647)**
8555 8555 8555 8555 8555 8555
Cancelled Coups 0.0729 0.1341 0.1414 0.1359 0.1564 0.1971
(0.0337)** (0.0546)** (0.0681)** (0.0730)* (0.0777)** (0.1018)*
15257 15257 15257 15257 15257 15257
Chile -0.0095 0.0172 0.0003 0.0214 0.0183 0.0104
(0.0066) (0.0274) (0.0373) (0.0491) (0.0510) (0.0620)
6091 6091 6091 6091 6091 6091
Congo 0.1667 0.2270 0.2014 0.2429 0.2283 0.2581
(0.0771)** (0.1196)* (0.1335) (0.1426)* (0.1546) (0.1719)
421 421 421 421 421 421
Congo-Belgium events 0.2730 0.2632 0.3179 0.4260 0.3914 0.4622
(0.0794)*** (0.1895) (0.1972) (0.2029)** (0.2182)* (0.2260)**
421 421 421 421 421 421
Cuba -0.0030 -0.0141 -0.0147 0.0039 0.0183 0.0147
(0.0079) (0.0125) (0.0178) (0.0202) (0.0222) (0.0263)
13602 13602 13602 13602 13602 13602
Guatemala 0.0491 0.1650 0.2049 0.1365 0.2011 0.1859
(0.0203)** (0.0530)*** (0.0896)** (0.1136) (0.1274) (0.1662)
1234 1234 1234 1234 1234 1234
Iran 0.0144 0.0739 0.1030 0.1229 0.1359 0.2017
(0.0110) (0.0184)*** (0.0428)** (0.0385)*** (0.0349)*** (0.0792)**
809 809 809 809 809 809
Notes: (1.) For single country regressions, the reported coefficient is on an indicator for authorization events 
interacted with company exposure, muliplied by the length of the window, (2.) Multi-country regressions report 
the mean of the country coefficients, (3.) All regressions control for an interaction of a company dummy (or 
country-specific company dummy for multi-country regressions) with the four Fama-French factors, (4.) All dates 
where a company changed its name or changed its outstanding shares by more than 5% were dropped, (5.) One 
day price changes greater than 50% in magnitude were dropped, (6.) "Successful coups" excludes Cuba, (7.) 
"Cancelled coups" only uses authorizations and deauthorizations of coups that were eventually cancelled, (8.) 
Column numbers at the top in parentheses denote the number of days before and after the authorizations which are 
included as part of the dummy variable for the authorization event, e.g., (0,3) refers to the return between the 
event date and three days after the event date, (9.) Standard errors reported in parentheses are the maximum of 
clustered by company, clustered by date, and robust, (10.) Statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels is 
denoted by *,**, and *** respectively. 
Main Effects - Cumulative Abnormal Returns
Effect of Secret Coup Authorizations on Stock Returns
 Table IVRaw Trend Market Matched Log
Returns Controls Placebo Placebo Volume
All Coups 0.0947 0.0723 0.1249 0.0989 0.0002 0.0068 19.0429
(0.0282)*** (0.0222)*** (0.0137)*** (0.0034)*** (0.0011) (0.0216) (2.2102)***
22157 22157 7123 22157 22157 17239 20895
Successful 0.1210 0.0939 0.1153 0.1259 -0.0013 0.0111 26.4944
Coups (0.0350)*** (0.0275)*** (0.0332)*** (0.0372)*** (0.0082) (0.0268) (3.3202)***
8555 8555 5224 8555 8555 6670 7324
Chile 0.0365 0.0191 0.1006 0.0243 0.0154 -0.0149 20.4970
(0.0371) (0.0279) (0.0765) (0.0319) (0.0136) (0.0317) (0.7534)***
6091 6091 3530 6091 6091 4764 6091
Congo 0.2274 0.1202 . 0.2532 -0.0067 -0.0245 .
(0.1180)* (0.0909) . (0.1282)** (0.0133) (0.0216) .
421 421 . 421 421 322 .
Cuba -0.0103 -0.0154 0.0276 -0.0098 0.0066 -0.0085 4.1386
(0.0138) (0.0124) (0.0365) (0.0144) (0.0088) (0.0145) (2.5058)*
13602 13602 1899 13602 13602 10569 13571
Guatemala 0.1394 0.1648 0.1373 0.1909 -0.0311 0.0255 32.4391
(0.0628)** (0.0530)*** (0.0603)** (0.0621)*** (0.0224) (0.0916) (12.5956)**
1234 1234 1068 1234 1234 965 1233
Iran 0.0806 0.0738 0.1061 0.0359 0.0171 0.0528 .
(0 0189)*** (0 0189)*** (0 0137)*** (0 0305) (0 0146) (0 0400)
Table V
Robustness
Public Events/NYT No NYT  News 
Subsample
(0.0189)*** (0.0189)*** (0.0137)*** (0.0305) (0.0146) (0.0400) .
809 809 398 809 809 619 .
Notes: (1.) Estimates are on (0,3) returns, (2.) For single country regressions, the reported coefficient is on an indicator for 
authorization events interacted with company exposure, muliplied by the length of the window (i.e., 4), (3.) Multi-country 
regressions report the mean of the country coefficients, (4.) Except for the "Raw returns" and "Market Placebo" 
specifications, regressions control for an interaction of a company dummy (or country-specific company dummy for multi-
country regressions) with the four Fama-French factors, (5.) All dates where a company changed its name or changed its 
outstanding shares by more than 5% were dropped, (6.) One day price changes greater than 50% in magnitude were 
dropped,  (7.) "Successful coups" excludes Cuba, (8.) Public information controls include (a.) an exposure-interacted 
country specific effect of the number of New York Times articles mentioning a country and its leader by name and (b.) 
country-specific interaction between public event dummies and exposure, (9.) No NYT column drops all observations with 
any New York Times articles mentioning a country and its leader by name on that date, (10.) "Trend controls" control for 
local trends by including an additional dummy in an 20 day symmetric window around each authorization date,
 (11.) "Market Placebo" regresses the NYSE return on the exposure-interacted event dates, (12.) "Matched Placebo" 
replaces each company's stock return with that of the company with the closest market capitalization, factor loadings, and 
mean and standard deviation of returns within the same 3-digit SIC code, (13.) Log Volume runs the baseline specification 
with the log of volume as the dependent variable, (14.) Standard errors reported  in parentheses are the maximum of 
clustered by company, clustered by date, and robust, (15.) Statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels is denoted by 
*,**, and *** respectively. 5 Country
Successful 
Coups Chile Congo Cuba Guatemala Iran
4 Day CAR 0.0262 0.0393 0.0189 0.0768 -0.0086 0.0239 0.0243
Asymptotic 
Standard Error (0.0030)*** (0.0039)*** (0.0149) (0.0195)*** (0.0076) (0.0093)** (0.0165)
Number of  22 16 4 5 6 4 3
Events
Number Above  18 15 3 5 3 4 3
Median
P-Value: 0.0022*** 0.0003*** 0.3125 0.0313** 0.6563 0.0625* 0.1250
Analytical
P-Value: 0.0035*** 0.0006*** 0.3294 0.0355** 0.6602 0.0688* 0.1357
Simulated
Number Above  13    12 2 5 1 3 2
80th Percentile
P-Value: 0.0001*** 0.0000*** 0.1808 0.0003*** 0.7395 0.0272** 0.1040
Analytical
P-Value: 0.0002** 0.0000*** 0.1921 0.0005*** 0.7403 0.0314** 0.1033
Simulated
Number Above  8 8 2 3 0 3 0
90th Percentile
P-Value: 0.0009*** 0.0001*** 0.0523* 0.00856*** 1.0000 0.0037*** 1.0000
Analytical
P-Value: 0.0011** 0.0003*** 0.0502* 0.0126** 1.0000 0.0059*** 1.0000
Simulated
Mean Rank 0.7440 0.8195 0.6417 0.9350 0.4418 0.8803 0.8211
P-Value: 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.1700 0.0000*** 0.6852 0.0022*** 0.0257**
Analytical
P-Value: 0.0006*** 0.0000*** 0.1766 0.0001*** 0.6952 0.0033*** 0.0261**
Simulated
Notes III (For the Uniform Rank Test): (1.) "Mean rank" is the average percentile rank of abnormal returns for events relative to the estimation window. (2.) "P-Value: Analytical" uses 
the uniform distribution to calculate the probability of having an average rank of K events greater than or equal to M, (3.) "P-Value: Simulated" reports the p-value for a simulated 








Notes I: (1.) This table reports 4 Day Cumulative Abnormal Returns using (exposure weighted) company portfolios for individual countries, (2) Multi-country estimates report 
averages of country portofolio returns, (3) Asymptotic standard error is computed using standard deviations of returns in the estimation sample; (4) , and *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance using asymptotic inference at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively, (3) “Successful Coups” excludes Cuba.
Notes II (For the Binomial Sign Test): (1.) "Number above the median" (and 80th and 90th percentiles) reports the number of 4-day events above the median (and 80th and 90th 
percentile) of the abnormal return distribution in the estimation window,  (2.) "P-Value: Analytical" reports the associated P-Value using the Binomial Distribution to give the 
probability of having at least X number of events above the cutoff  (median or80th or  90th percentile), (3.) "P-Value: Simulated" reports the p-value for a simulated distribution of 
having at least X number of events above the cutoff (median or 80th percentile or 90th percentile) out of Y total events, accounting for the cutoff value being estimated using the actual 
b f d i th ti ti lAll 0.1211 0.1004 0.1204 0.3136 0.4455 0.7575
(0.0463)*** (0.0259)***
22173 22165
Top 4 0.1335 0.1179 0.1459 0.4248 0.5928 0.7828
(0.0603)** (0.0419)***
8571 8563
Chile 9/11/1973 9/11/1973 0.0613 0.0613 0.0183 0.0750 0.1410 0.5503
(0.0250)** (0.0250)**
6097 6097
Congo 2/5/1961 2/5/1961 0.0869 0.0869 0.2283 0.2283 0.3350 0.7242
(0.0947) (0.0947)
421 421
Cuba 4/15/1961 4/20/1961 -0.0445 -0.0546 0.0183 0.0370 (0.0196) (2.1047)
(0.0283) (0.0141)***
13602 13602
Guatemala 6/19/1954 6/28/1954 -0.1030 0.2274 0.2011 0.4426 0.7706 0.6606
(0.1737) (0.0704)***
                                                                             1235
Iran 8/15/1953 8/20/1953 0.1875 0.0703 0.1359 0.4657 0.5686 0.8689
(0.1054)* (0.0526)
813 810
Notes:  (1.) For single country regressions, the reported coefficient is on an indicator for the relevant coup period interacted with company exposure, muliplied by the length of the 
relevant coup period, (2.) Multi-country regressions report the mean of the country coefficients, (3.) The coup window is defined as the full length of time between beginning and 
end of the coup , the first day of the coup, or the first day of the new government after the coup (in the case of Cuba this is the first day after the end of the invasion), (4.)  All 
regressions control for an interaction of a company dummy (or country-specific company dummy for multi-country regressions) with the four Fama-French factors, (5.) All dates 
where a company changed its name or changed its outstanding shares by more than 5% were dropped,  (6.) Since Cuba's coup was unssuccesful, the stock price changes are 
negative, (7.) Standard errors reported  in parentheses are the maximum of clustered by company, clustered by date, and robust. (8.) Statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels is denoted by *,**, and *** respectively. (9.) Per event authorization event gain is the cumulative abnormal return over a thirteen day period for a company in a country 
estimated individually, (10.) Total gains from authorization events is one plus the abnormal return to the power of the number of net events; in the case of Guatemala, the number 
of net events is 2 out of total 4 events since one event was an aborted coup and thus counted as negative; in the case of Congo, the number of net events is 1, because out of 5 
events, two are negative; in the case of Cuba, the net events is 2 because 2 of the 6 events are negative, (11.) The multi-country decomposition raises one plus the estimated mean 
multi-country effect to the power of the average number of events across the relevant countries and uses the relevant multi-country first day of new government estimate for the 
gain from the coup event, (12.) The total gain from authorization plus coup events is the cumulative gain from the authorization events times one plus the gain from the first day of 
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First Day of 
New 
Government Coup Begin Coup EndNotes: (1.) The thicker line (and the diamond symbols) represent the average of country-specific coefficients on an indicator for authorization 
events interacted with company exposure, muliplied by the length of the window, (2.) The horizontal axis labels denote the number of days 
before or after the authorizations which are included as part of the dummy variable for the authorization event, e.g., 4 refers to the return 
between the event date and four days after the event date while -4 refers to the return between four days prior to the event date and the event 
date, (3.) All regressions control for an interaction of a country-specific company dummy with the four Fama-French factors, (4.) All dates 
where a company changed its name or changed its outstanding shares by more than 5% were dropped, (5.) One day price changes greater than 
50% in magnitude were dropped, (5.) The thinner lines (and square symbols) represent the 95% confidence interval using standard errors that 




























































































Iran Cumulative Abnormal Returns
Notes: (1.) The thicker line (and the diamond symbols) represent the coefficients on an indicator for authorization events interacted with company exposure, muliplied by the length of the window, (2.) The 
horizontal axis labels denote the number of days before or after the authorizations which are included as part of the dummy variable for the authorization event, e.g., 4 refers to the return between the event d
and four days after the event date while -4 refers to the return between four days prior to the event date and the event date, (3.) All regressions control for an interaction of a company dummy with the four 
Fama-French factors, (4.) All dates where a company changed its name or changed its outstanding shares by more than 5% were dropped, (5.) One day price changes greater than 50% in magnitude were 































































































































Number of Days Shifted From Actual Event Date
Figure III 
Time-Shifted Placebos
() p ( ) g yp g y
an indicator for authorization events interacted with company exposure and multiplied by the four day window including 
and after an authorization event, (2.) The horizontal axis labels denote the number of days by which we shift the 
authorization date, e.g., 20 represents the four day return if we shift the authorization day forward by 20 days, while -20 
represents a four day return if we shift the authorization date backwards by 20 days, (3.) All regressions control for an 
interaction of a country-specific company dummy with the four Fama-French factors, (4.) All dates where a company 
changed its name or changed its outstanding shares by more than 5% were dropped, (5.) One day price changes greater 
than 50% in magnitude were dropped, (6.) The dashed line represent the 95% confidence interval using standard errors 
that are the maximum of standard errors clustered by company, clustered by date, and robust.